In text-books on political science, the mutual relation among the three types of system named above is usually presented in this way:

Economic and political systems are components of a broader social system. Politics and economy are not completely separate, they influence each other and develop through constant interaction. Any given social system can only give birth to and maintain a political and economic system which roughly corresponds to the degree of development of the society in question. At a certain moment in history, every political system until now became obsolete and was replaced by another, better suited to the new social and economic situation.

Marxism tried to explain these changes in a one-sided way, by stressing economic factors operating in a simplified, bipolar social setting and resulting in violent upheavals. This way of looking at things was highly influenced by Marx's personal experience (several revolutions), the level of development of contemporary science (determinism, materialism) and the grave social problems generated by erstwhile capitalism.

In the late twentieth century, if not earlier, it has become evident that Marxism was wrong in almost every respect. But in spite of all its errors, over a century or so, it did succeed in captivating the imagination not only of a bunch of revolutionary fanatics but also of many honest intellectuals and "average" citizens. Why? The reason must be the fact that Marxism had something which other social and political doctrines lack: a comprehensive and optimistic vision of the future development of human societies.

Our work tries to fill the gap opened by the failure of Marxism, without leaving the solid foundation of contemporary science. As far as we can see, politologists and most other researchers in the field of social science are too involved in the establislunents of their respective countries to dare express explicitly what, in their hearts, they cannot ignore. Their writings are unable to inspire popular movements in the same way as Marxism once did.

And yet, the situation in the world is anything but idyllic. Environmental pollution, unemployment, growth of islamic and even Christian fundamentalism, drug addiction, criminality, ethnic conflicts in many countries and so on - all cry out for a remedy. At the same time, traditional political systems of all descriptions, including what is called "western democracy", prove increasingly impotent vis-a-vis all these problems.

Several observers have pointed out that the social and political situation in the West now resembles the situation in France in the decades preceding the Great Revolution. If this is the case, we are heading for a radical change. But is this expectation really correct? Let us cast a glance at three major historical events to see if there are similarities with to-day's situation in the West, the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century A.D., the abolition of feudalism in France in the late eighteenth century and the collapse of the Soviet empire two hundred years later.

The current explanation of the fall of the Roman Empire runs approximately as follows: The size of the Empire became so large that Roman troops and officials were no longer able to control it; at the same time, there was increasing pressure from German tribes who eventually conquered Rome and deposed the last puppet emperor. This explanation, however, does not tell the whole story.

Perhaps even more important was the increasing corruption of Rome's ruling elite. After the death of Marcus Aurelius, the last great emperor, came an irreversible decline beginning with Commodus. Instead of maintaining law and order, the officials mostly tried to enrich themselves. In order to squeeze as much money as possible from the economic system, they succeeded throttling this very system by a strait jacket of bureaucratic rules and practices. As a result, the whole economy collapsed. (In our century, the communists did exactly that and with the same outcome.)

To buy and sell for money became, to a great extent, impossible. Instead, people began anew to practice barter. Personal relations of allegiance began to carry more weight than centrally imposed legal rules. In other words: Rome's political system, originally based on rudimentary representation, universality and at least a theoretical equality among her citizens, became incongruent with the new social situation, based on local feudal relations and barter economy. The outcome could only be one, a collapse of the political system.

In eighteenth century France, the situation was, in some respects, similar, but in others quite the opposite. The similarity concerns the corruption of the ruling elite - the aristocrats and the clergy.

At the beginning, promotion to nobility was used as a reward for personal merit. The first noblemen reached their high positions in society because they deserved it. When titles became hereditary, personal merit was no longer a necessity. In the eighteenth century, many aristocrats were worthless parasites living in luxury while their peasants starved.

At the same time, they paid no taxes. The tax burden lay heavy only on the lower classes. The exchequer was bancrupt owing to a series of wars. Under these circumstances, the explosion was inevitable. But contrary to what had been the case in ancient Rome, there was also a "Third Estate", a relatively well-to-do bourgeoisie gathering momentum in a favourable economic setting. As in ancient Rome, the obsolete feudal political system became incongruent with the new social and economic situation and was therefore bound to collapse.

However, owing to the above mentioned circumstances, the upheaval did not result in a collapse of society as a whole, but only in a removal from power (albeit at the beginning only temporary) of the representatives of the "ancien régime" and in the succesive establishment of political systems better suited for the now rapidly developing society.